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Entanglement-Secured Single-Qubit Quantum Secret Sharing
P. Scherpelz,∗ R. Resch,† D. Berryrieser,‡ and T. W. Lynn§
Department of Physics, Harvey Mudd College, 301 Platt Blvd., Claremont, CA, 91711.
(Dated: November 5, 2018)
In single-qubit quantum secret sharing, a secret is shared between N parties via manipulation
and measurement of one qubit at a time. Each qubit is sent to all N parties in sequence; the secret
is encoded in the first participant’s preparation of the qubit state and the subsequent participants’
choices of state rotation or measurement basis. We present a protocol for single-qubit quantum secret
sharing using polarization entanglement of photon pairs produced in type-I spontaneous parametric
downconversion. We investigate the protocol’s security against eavesdropping attack under common
experimental conditions: a lossy channel for photon transmission, and imperfect preparation of the
initial qubit state. A protocol which exploits entanglement between photons, rather than simply po-
larization correlation, is more robustly secure. We implement the entanglement-based secret-sharing
protocol with 87% secret-sharing fidelity, limited by the purity of the entangled state produced by
our present apparatus. We demonstrate a photon-number splitting eavesdropping attack, which
achieves no success against the entanglement-based protocol while showing the predicted rate of
success against a correlation-based protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is the general term for a communica-
tion task in which one participant (the sender) wants to
share a message with multiple other participants (the re-
cipients) in a way that forces the recipients to cooperate
with one another to reconstruct the message. The task
is relevant when recipients are considered more trustwor-
thy as a group than individually. In the strongest version
of secret sharing, the message can be fully reconstructed
by the full set of N − 1 recipients; however, any subset
of N − 2 or fewer recipients possesses zero information
regarding the message. This task can be implemented
classically by distributing between N−1 recipients N−2
randomly generated bit strings, or ‘shadows,’ and a final
(N − 1)th ‘shadow’ string which is the bitwise sum or
XOR of the other N − 2 strings and the original mes-
sage. All N − 1 recipients together can reconstruct the
message by taking the XOR of their shadows; however,
any proper subset of recipients possesses no information
about the message.
Classical secret sharing protocols generally do not in-
volve the secure transmission of the shadows, leaving this
task to cryptographic protocols. The emerging field of
quantum cryptography hinges on the secure transmission
of information encoded in quantum states. Thus, by us-
ing quantum states to encode and distribute the shadows,
secure communication can be built into a secret sharing
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protocol; quantum-state resources enhance the sharing of
classical bit-string sequences. Such quantum-mechanical
resources can be brought to the task of secret sharing in
several distinct ways.
The original quantum secret sharing protocol, pre-
sented in 1999 [1], requires the use of a multipartite en-
tangled state. Specifically, to share a single-bit secret
between a sender and N − 1 recipients, the N -qubit en-
tangled state 1√
2
[|0〉1|0〉2 . . . |0〉N + |1〉1|1〉2 . . . |1〉N ] must
be produced, and the individual qubits distributed be-
tween the participants. This quantum secret sharing pro-
tocol is in principle quite powerful. It allows participants
to share secrets composed not only of bit values (0 or
1) but of complete qubits (quantum states of the form
a|0〉+eiϕb|1〉). The production of multipartite entangled
states is unfortunately a technical challenge, requiring an
experimental tour de force at each realization [2–6].
Single-qubit quantum secret sharing (SQQSS), by con-
trast, was first proposed and demonstrated in 2005 [7, 8]
using photon pairs produced by type-II spontaneous
parametric downconversion (SPDC). The protocol in-
volves the transmission of a single qubit a|0〉 + eiϕb|1〉
through the entire sequence of participants. The sender
prepares a state with a specific value of ϕ and each re-
cipient performs a simple operation to alter ϕ. The final
participant performs a measurement on the qubit whose
outcome depends on the final value of ϕ, and the secret
– the initial ϕ value – can be reconstructed only when
all recipients reveal their individual operations. Such a
protocol uses quantum resources to allow secure shar-
ing of a classical secret, but does not enable the more
powerful sharing of a full quantum-state secret. On the
other hand, SQQSS relies on physical states which can
be easily produced and manipulated in the laboratory, al-
lowing for the straightforward realization of the protocols
and demonstration of their successes and vulnerabilities.
The original SQQSS protocol, with proposed precautions
2and coding repetitions [9, 10], provides security against
numerous cheating attacks by a subset of recipients.
In this work, we experimentally implement two varia-
tions on the protocol of [7, 8], adapted for use with type-I
SPDC. One version, like the original, relies only on polar-
ization correlation in photon pairs; the other directly ex-
ploits the quantum entanglement between photons. We
note the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two
versions. In particular, we develop and implement a
photon-number splitting (PNS) eavesdropping attack; in
the presence of a lossy transmission channel and imper-
fect state preparation, this eavesdropping attack works
against the correlation-based protocol but fails against
the entanglement-secured version.
II. SINGLE-QUBIT QUANTUM SECRET
SHARING SCHEMES USING TYPE-I SPDC
A. Correlation-Based Protocol
The SQQSS protocol relies on the secure transmission
of one qubit to a number of participants sequentially.
In order to prevent individual participants from cheat-
ing, however, this signal qubit must be produced and
detected in correlation with a partner qubit, called the
idler. In both the original version [7] and our own vari-
ation, the qubits are encoded in the polarizations of a
pair of photons produced in SPDC. Thus henceforth we
will refer specifically to polarization states of photons
rather than to generic two-state quantum systems. Our
correlation-based protocol for type-I SPDC closely fol-
lows the original treatment of [7] for the type-II case.
The sharing of a secret begins with the creation of a
pair of photons in the polarization-entangled state
|ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉+ |V V 〉) (1)
where H denotes horizontal polarization and V vertical
polarization of each photon. The idler photon passes
through a polarizer oriented to transmit |H〉, while the
signal photon passes through a chain of SQQSS partic-
ipants. Taken on its own, the polarization state of the
signal photon as it enters the SQQSS chain is undefined.
However, the final step in the protocol is the detection
of the signal and idler photons in coincidence with one
another. This coincidence detection projects the signal
photon, at its entry into the SQQSS chain, into the state
|H〉.
The SQQSS chain is shown conceptually in Fig. 1.
It begins with the sender, who uses a combination of
waveplates to transform the signal photon to one of the
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FIG. 1: A schematic of the single qubit quantum secret shar-
ing protocol. The qubit is initially in the state | + x〉 =
1√
2
(|H〉+|V 〉), conditioned on coincident detection of the idler
photon (gating). Each participant applies a relative phase
shift ϕj ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} to the |V 〉 component. The half-
wave plate (HWP) and polarizing beam splitter (PBS) allow
for measurement of the final state in the |±x〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉±|V 〉)
basis.
four states
|+ x〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉),
|+ y〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ i|V 〉),
| − x〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉), (2)
| − x〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 − i|V 〉).
This is equivalent to the preparation of | + x〉 followed
by use of a tilt-adjustable phase plate to obtain one of
| ± x〉, | ± y〉, as shown in Fig. 1. The signal photon
then passes to N − 1 recipients in turn; each one uses a
tilt-adjustable phase plate to apply a randomly selected
phase shift ϕj ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} so that after partici-
pant k, the signal photon state is
|χk〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ exp(i
k∑
j=1
ϕj)|V 〉). (3)
Overall, j ranges from 1 to N to account for the sender
(i = 1) and N − 1 recipients. The set of four possible
phase shifts can be broken down into two classes:
ClassX ⇒ ϕj ∈ {0, pi}
ClassY ⇒ ϕj ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2}. (4)
The sender’s choice of state preparation likewise falls into
either Class X , for creation of | ± x〉, or Class Y , for
creation of | ± y〉.
Thus each participant so far possesses a single ‘class’
bit denoting which class they have chosen, but also a
second ‘secret’ bit consisting of their phase choice within
that class. After N participants have applied their local
3operations, the initial signal photon state |H〉 is trans-
formed to the state
|χN 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉+ exp(i
N∑
j=1
ϕj)|V 〉). (5)
These phase changes are illustrated in Fig. 1.
At this point, the final participant measures the polar-
ization of the signal photon in the |±x〉 = (1/√2)(|H〉±
|V 〉) basis, conducting the measurement in coincidence
with the idler photon as specified earlier. The measurer
records the measurement outcome, and the physical as-
pect of the SQQSS is complete.
Notice that if the final state is of the form
|χN 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉), (6)
then the measurement outcome will be | + x〉 or | − x〉,
each with probability 1. However, if
|χN 〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± i|V 〉), (7)
the final measurement result will be random.
Therefore, after the measurement is performed, the N
participants publicly announce the class of the operation
they applied, and the total number of Class Y operations
is counted. If the number of Class Y operations was
even, the run is valid; the N − 1 recipients can expect to
reconstruct the secret from their shadows. If the number
of Class Y operations was odd, then the run is discarded;
this happens half the time on average.
For valid runs, the remaining ‘secret’ bit value retained
by each participant regarding their applied operation
constitutes that participant’s shadow (or the sender’s se-
cret). The last participant also holds the record of the
measurement outcome. Only if the N−1 recipients share
their shadows can they determine the sender’s secret, ϕ1.
Finally, to prevent cheating, a random subset of the
bits must be checked. To do this, the first N participants
announce in random order their actual phase changes ϕj
for a subset of runs randomly selected by the sender. The
expected measurement result for each run is computed
and compared to the measurement result announced by
the final participant. If any recipient attempts to cheat
by measuring the single-photon state and sending a newly
prepared version along to subsequent participants, the
bit error rate rises to at least 25%. Thus, if the protocol
shows an error rate of less than 25%, cheating of this
form can be ruled out.
Restrictions on the order of the class announcements,
along with repetitions of the protocol with coding en-
hancements, can be implemented to make the protocol
more secure, defending even against cheaters with their
own entangled-pair resources [10]. Alternately, the proto-
col can defend against cheating by a subset of recipients
(participants 2 through N) via a simpler modification:
instead of measuring the signal photon, participant N is
required to transmit it back to the sender, participant
1. The sender then measures the photon in either the
| ± x〉 or | ± y〉 basis, but all recipients announce their
class choices before the sender announces the sending and
measurement classes. Runs with even numbers of Class
X operations, including the measurement class, are con-
sidered valid. This protocol defends against cheating,
even with entangled-pair resources, by any subset of the
recipients. It privileges the trusted sender of the mes-
sage, but the sender already occupies a position of trust
by knowing the original secret, in many if not all possible
applications.
B. Entanglement-Based Protocol
In both type-I protocols, the signal and idler photons
are first generated as the entangled pair of Eq. 1. In the
correlation-based protocol, all measurements are done in
coincidence with detection of the idler photon in the state
|H〉. Thus the signal photon is projected into the state
|H〉 as well, and then rotated into | ± x〉 or | ± y〉 state
afterwards by means of phase-shifting optics. As pointed
out in Refs. [7, 8], the polarization correlation between
the signal and idler photons is crucial for the security of
the protocol; a cheater or eavesdropper, who does not
have access to the idler photon, therefore has no infor-
mation on the initial polarization of the signal photon.
Because the signal photon’s initial state is ill-defined,
subsequent measurements by the cheater cannot reveal
information about the phase changes applied by sender
or recipients.
However, while the correlation-based protocol relies on
the polarization correlation between signal and idler, it
does not rely explicitly on the quantum entanglement
between them. This insensitivity to entanglement per se
can be viewed as a strength of the protocol, giving robust-
ness against imperfect entanglement in the form of a lack
of coherence between the two terms in the superposition
of Eq. 1. However, by failing to fully exploit the quan-
tum entanglement in the initial resource the correlation-
based protocol passes up a chance for enhanced security
against eavesdropping attacks, as we demonstrate in the
next section.
The entanglement-based protocol which follows makes
full and explicit use of the entanglement between signal
and idler in order to prepare the signal photon in the state
| + x〉 before it enters the chain of SQQSS participants.
Unlike a classical mixture, the initial entangled state can
be rewritten as
|ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉+ |V V 〉) = 1√
2
(|+x,+x〉+ |−x,−x〉).
(8)
Relying on this equality, we orient the idler polarizer to
transmit only |+x〉 polarization. Detection of the signal
photon in coincidence with the idler then projects the
signal photon into the |+x〉 state as it enters the SQQSS
chain. The sender and recipient roles remain the same as
4before, except that the measurement of the signal photon
is now conducted in coincidence with the |+ x〉-selected
idler.
The success of the entanglement-based protocol de-
pends entirely on the presence of entanglement, rather
than classical correlation, between the signal and idler
polarizations. To the extent that the initial state is a
classical mixture of |HH〉 and |V V 〉, projection of the
idler photon onto | + x〉 will leave the signal photon in
an uncertain polarization state rather than projecting it
onto |+x〉. Thus the success rate, or fidelity, of the secret-
sharing transmission is sensitive to the purity of entan-
glement in this protocol. However, the explicit use of
entanglement makes this protocol robust against certain
eavesdropping attacks and cheating strategies to which
the correlation-based protocol is vulnerable. We present
one such attack, a photon-number splitting exploitation
of experimental asymmetries, in the next section.
III. PHOTON-NUMBER SPLITTING
EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
The correlation-based SQQSS protocol, in an ideal re-
alization, provides security against eavesdropping. How-
ever, the protocol remains vulnerable to attacks that
may arise due to the imperfections of implementation.
In quantum communication in general (for example, in
quantum key distribution), these forms of attack have
been some of the greatest obstacles to securely imple-
menting protocols [11–13]. Such attacks include the pos-
sibility of splitting off and measuring a fraction of the
photons in a pulse that is sent for each qubit (photon-
number splitting), or adding photons to the channel and
later extracting them for measurement (Trojan-Horse at-
tacks) [14]. Here we focus on robustness against a photon
number-splitting, or PNS, attack.
In a PNS attack, an eavesdropper takes advantage of
the fact that implementations may involve transmission
of pulses with the possibility of multiple photons per
qubit. The eavesdropper ‘splits’ off some of the photons,
and measures the state of their polarization, while the
remaining photons pass through to the intended receiver
untouched. Unless the intended receiver can detect the
decreased signal size, the eavesdropper gains information
about the message without alerting the participants to
her presence.
There are many ways of avoiding PNS attacks in quan-
tum key distribution, including decoy states, strong ref-
erence pulses, and differential phase shifts [15, 16]. The
correlation-based protocol protects against PNS by ref-
erencing the signal photon to the idler photon, which
is passed through a polarizer before being detected. A
PNS eavesdropper cannot discover whether her ’picked-
off’ signal photons are coincident with the correct idler
photons; thus she gains no information about the polar-
ization state of the signal [8].
However, this protection is only completely valid in the
case for which the two photons are produced with perfect
symmetry in their polarization states, as in Eq. 1. Given
common issues in the production of this entangled state,
the photons may actually be in the state
|ψ0,asymm〉 = a|HH〉+
√
1− a2|V V 〉 (9)
with a2 6= 1/2. This state may be the overall two-photon
state produced, or the emitted state may be symmetric
but with correlations between polarization and other de-
grees of freedom (such as energy or spatial mode) which
make it possible for an eavesdropper to filter her detec-
tion so she is dealing with an asymmetric state. In ei-
ther case, the difference in the probability of detecting
the signal photon in its two polarization states can give
information to an eavesdropper. An eavesdropper, Eve,
can gather this information by splitting off some photons,
and using a beamsplitter to measure half of them in the
| ± x〉 basis and the other half in the | ± y〉 basis.
A. Attack on Correlation-Based Protocol
To quantify this attack, let us assume that Eve is eaves-
dropping on the correlation-based protocol, just after the
sender has applied a phase shift to the photon. We want
to find the probability that for a given a2 6= 1/2 and
n photons measured by Eve, Eve can distinguish what
state the sender has prepared. If she can reliably deter-
mine the qubit state, she has intercepted the secret. Eve
will attempt to distinguish the qubit state by counting
the number of photons detected in each of her four de-
tectors (corresponding to measured photon state | + x〉,
|−x〉, |+y〉 and |−y〉). She will then guess the bit value
associated with the detector which registered the greatest
number of counts. This is not the only possible algorithm
for deciding which bit value Eve will guess; however, this
algorithm does yield better-than-random results for Eve
whenever the vulnerability a2 6= 1/2 exists.
We assume for the sake of simplicity that the sender
applies 0 phase shift, and thus Eve intercepts the signal
photon which is the second member of the entangled state
|ψ1〉 = a|+ x,H〉+
√
1− a2| − x, V 〉. (10)
(If the sender applies a different phase shift, the polar-
ization states will be different, but Eve’s success in iden-
tifying the correct bit does not change.) Given that the
idler photon remains unmeasured, we can then find the
probability that Eve measures the signal photon in either
|+ x〉 or | − x〉, as well as in either |+ y〉 or | − y〉. If the
photon goes to the | ± x〉-basis detectors, the probability
of registering |+ x〉 is
p(|+ x〉) = 〈ψ1|P+x,s ⊗ Ii|ψ1〉. (11)
This evaluates simply to a2, and similarly the probability
of registering | − x〉 is 1 − a2. If the photon goes to the
5| ± y〉-basis detectors, the probability of measuring |+ y〉
is
p(|+ y〉) =〈ψ1|P+y,s ⊗ Ii|ψ1〉 (12)
=
a2 + (1− a2)
2
=1/2,
and the probability of measuring |−y〉 is likewise 1/2. For
the eavesdropper, then, for any single intercepted photon
the probabilities of detection in |+ x〉, | − x〉, |+ y〉, and
| − y〉 are a2/2, (1− a2)/2, 1/4, and 1/4, respectively.
Let us assume that n total photons can be diverted and
detected by Eve. The probability of registering i counts
in the | + x〉 detector, j counts in the | − x〉 detector, k
counts in the | + y〉 detector, and l counts in the | − y〉
detector is
ci,j,k,l =
n!
i!j!k!l!
(
a2
2
)i(
1− a2
2
)j (
1
4
)k (
1
4
)l
. (13)
Eve will successfully identify the secret if the | + x〉
detector registers the most counts (i > j, k, l), but also if
the |+ y〉 detector registers the most counts (l > i, j, k),
since either + result maps to the same secret bit value.
To exactly predict Eve’s success rate, however, we must
also consider the possibility that two or more detectors
tie for the most counts. In this case, we let Eve randomly
select one of the tying detectors and base her bit-value
guess on that detector. With this strategy in mind, we
can assign to each outcome a probability of occurring,
and a likelihood for Eve to succeed in that case.
Thus we can calculate the probability pEve,n for Eve to
successfully identify a bit by intercepting n = i+j+k+ l
photons to be (pi indicates the probability that i > j, k, l,
while pi=j indicates the probability that i = j > k, l, and
so forth):
pEve,n =
1
2
[1 + pi − pj + pi=k − pj=k]
+
1
6
[pi=k=l − pj=k=l]
≈1
2
[1 + pi − pj ] , for large n. (14)
The final approximation simply neglects ties between the
detectors, which become rare in the limit of large n [17].
Finally, we use Eq. 13 to evaluate the probabilities pi,
etc. in Eq. 14. A plot of Eve’s predicted success rates
as a function of a2, for various numbers of ‘picked-off’
photons per qubit, is shown in Fig. 2.
We have focused on Eve’s success rate when a2 > 1/2;
however, if a2 < 1/2 Eve will have exactly the same suc-
cess rate if she systematically reverses her bit-guessing
strategy. Thus Eve can be successful as long as (i) some
|HH〉 vs. |V V 〉 asymmetry exists in the initially pro-
duced two-photon state and (ii) she is able to indepen-
dently gauge the success of a small number of her guesses
in order to decide whether or not to reverse her guessing
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Ev
e'
s 
su
cc
es
s 
ra
te
1.00.90.80.70.60.5
a
2
correlation-based
protocol:
 10 
 25
 50
 100
photons intercepted
FIG. 2: Bitwise probability of successful secret identifica-
tion by Eve, using a photon-number splitting attack on the
correlation-based SQQSS protocol. Eve’s success rate is
shown as a function of a2, the probability of |HH〉 in the
emitted entangled state (as filtered by Eve’s detection). Be-
cause the calculation is symmetric in a2 and b2 = 1 − a2,
P (1 − a2) = P (a2) can be used to give the probability of
success for a2 < 0.5. Eve’s success rates are shown for
n = (10, 25, 50, 100) where n is the number of photons de-
tected in Eve’s apparatus for each qubit. An eavesdropper
detecting an asymmetric two-photon initial state with a good
signal-to-noise ratio (points) achieves results in close agree-
ment with theory (curves).
strategy (a common tactic in codebreaking scenarios). If
Eve can listen in on classical communications between the
secret-sharing participants, for instance, the runs used
for checking error rate should allow her to determine the
correct guessing strategy.
It is clear that photon number splitting requires access
to many photons. For a2 = 0.6, measuring 100 photons
gives Eve a theoretical 78% success rate for determining
the secret bit value. The attack is especially strong when
a pulse of large, indefinite photon number must be sent
for each qubit.
B. Robustness of Entanglement-Based Protocol
The correlation-based protocol for type-I SPDC is par-
ticularly vulnerable to our PNS attack because state
asymmetry of the type denoted by Eq. 9 with a2 6= 1/2
is particularly common. For example, it tends to arise
from unequal thicknesses or orientations of the two crys-
tals used for SPDC, or from imprecision in the input
polarization of the SPDC pump beam. The same type
of asymmetric initial state arises in type-II SPDC, for
example from imperfect alignment of the signal and idler
paths with the positions of perfect overlap of the type-II
output cones. Even in systems for which the overall state
6has good symmetry, more troubling is the existence of
correlations between photon polarization in the H/V ba-
sis and other degrees of freedom, particularly for pulsed
sources [18–20], which otherwise provide an added advan-
tage of well-defined pulse arrival times. Correlations of
this sort allow the eavesdropper to measure an effectively
asymmetric state by filtering her detection on a second
degree of freedom. A typical defense against this issue is
to strongly pre-filter the entangled state at its source, but
this solution drastically reduces source brightness and
secret-sharing transmission rate. Schemes have been pro-
posed to eliminate unwanted correlations without loss of
brightness [21–23], and improvements via these schemes
have begun to be demonstrated experimentally [24, 25].
However, it is of interest to explore an approach that im-
proves the security of single-qubit quantum secret shar-
ing without recourse to either a loss of brightness or these
additional complications.
Asymmetry between the two terms in the initial su-
perposition or in Eve’s detected state gives rise to a bias
in the signal photon’s polarization state – even when ob-
served without coincidence detection. This bias is ex-
ploited by the PNS eavesdropper. By contrast, if a2 6=
1/2 in the (possibly filtered) state but the entanglement-
based protocol is followed, the single-particle state of
the signal photon remains randomly distributed between
|+ x〉 and | − x〉 before the actions of the SQQSS partic-
ipants. This can be seen quite simply by rewriting the
state in the {|+ x〉, | − x〉} basis for each photon:
|ψ0,asymm〉 =a|HH〉+
√
1− a2|V V 〉
=
1
2
(
a+
√
1− a2
)
(|+ x,+x〉 + | − x,−x〉)
(15)
+
1
2
(
a−
√
1− a2
)
(|+ x,−x〉 + | − x,+x〉) .
It can easily be seen from this expression that the signal
photon is found in |+ x〉 50% of the time and | − x〉 50%
of the time, if no polarization information is gathered for
the idler.
Indeed, if the initial entangled state were asymmetric
in the x basis, there would be a parallel PNS eavesdrop-
ping attack, but asymmetries in the x basis are much
less likely simply because of the physical way in which
the entangled pair is produced via SPDC. Therefore the
entanglement-based protocol, while it makes the fidelity
of the transmission more sensitive, also provides built-in
security against common exploitations by an eavesdrop-
per.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
A. Realization of Correlation-Based SQQSS
We now turn to implementations of both correlation-
based and entanglement-based protocols with a secret
FIG. 3: (a) Experimental setup for the correlation-based pro-
tocol. The sender is composed of the first 810-nm HWP along
with the first YVO4 crystal. Additional YVO4 crystals are the
phase-shifting recipients in the protocol. The idler polarizer
is set to accept horizontal polarization, which projects the
signal photon into |H〉 at its entry into the SQQSS chain. (b)
In the entanglement-based protocol, the idler polarizer is set
to accept |+x〉 polarization, projecting the signal photon into
|+x〉 at its entry into the SQQSS chain. The sender prepares
the state using just the first YVO4 crystal.
sender and two recipients. An experimental schematic
for the correlation-based SQQSS is shown in Fig. 3. En-
tangled photon pairs are produced via type-I degener-
ate spontaneous parametric downconversion [26] in a pair
of 0.5mm-thick BBO crystals pumped with a 50mW cw
diode laser at 405nm. A 405-nm half waveplate and a
tiltable quartz phase plate control the input pump beam
polarization; these are set to prepare the initial entan-
gled state of Eq. 1 for the signal and idler photons at
810nm. The BBO crystals are cut at 29.15◦ for non-
collinear downconversion, with the signal and idler at 3◦
from the pump beam path.
A Glan-Thompson polarizer in the idler beam path al-
lows selective detection of |H〉 for the idler photon. An
810-nm half waveplate in the signal arm converts |H〉 to
| + x〉. Now the sender and two recipients apply phase
shifts ϕj ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. Each phase shift is accom-
plished using a 200-micron-thick uniaxial YVO4 crystal.
The tilt of each crystal about a vertical axis is controlled
to obtain the desired phase shift. A compensation YVO4
crystal corrects for time spreading between the polar-
izations. The final recipient measures the signal photon
polarization in the |±x〉 basis using an 810nm half wave-
plate and a polarizing beamsplitter, sending signal pho-
tons into one of two detectors. Signal and idler photons
are detected by coupling into multimode fibers en route
to single-photon counting modules and coincidence detec-
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FIG. 4: Experimentally observed fidelity, or probability of
‘sharing’ the correct qubit, using the entanglement-based pro-
tocol. Fidelity is displayed as a function of the phase-shifting
angle of each YVO4 phase plate, averaged over all settings
of the other YVO4 phase plates. The overall 13% qubit er-
ror rate is well below the 25% rate for reliable detection of
cheaters. Variation of fidelity between phase plate settings
matches predictions based on precision of phase plate tilting.
The overall fidelity matches predictions based on phase spread
in the initial two-photon entangled state.
tion with a time resolution of 4ns. The overall efficiency
of detection is approximately 2%.
B. Realization of Entanglement-Based SQQSS
An experimental schematic for the entanglement-based
protocol is shown in Fig. 3. The polarizer in the idler
arm is rotated to select | + x〉 idler polarization. The
810nm half waveplate in the idler arm is no longer neces-
sary, so the sender is realized entirely by the first tiltable
YVO4 phase plate. All other aspects of the setup remain
unchanged from the correlation-based experiment.
To measure the rate of success in secret sharing, many
runs with different secret and shadow bits were car-
ried out using automated experiment control and data
acquisition. For each run, secret and shadow bits, as
well as the auxiliary Class X/Y bits, were chosen ran-
domly. The random number choices determined settings
for the YVO4 crystals, which were tilted using software-
controlled motorized rotation platforms. All measure-
ments were done by counting coincidences between the
idler channel and the two signal channels over a minimum
time interval of 0.1 s, limited by data acquisition tech-
niques. Per-photon probabilities of detection were cal-
culated, when necessary, from the observed coincidence
rates.
Observed success rates for the entanglement-based pro-
tocol are shown in Fig. 4. The overall error rate of 13%
is well below the 25% threshold for reliable detection of
cheaters, so secret-sharing has been realized in this im-
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FIG. 5: (a) Schematic for measuring purity (mixedness) of
two-photon entangled state, due to uncompensated spread in
phase φ of state 1√
2
(|HH〉 + eiφ|V V 〉). Coincidence counts
between signal and idler photons are measured with the idler
linear polarizer fixed at 0◦ or 45◦; a half waveplate in the
signal arm is rotated to change the linear polarization trans-
mitted through the polarizing beamsplitter. (b) Coincidence
counts observed. Diminished fringe visibility with the idler
polarizer at 45◦ gives a purity of 0.78 for the two-photon state,
accounting for our observed secret-sharing error rate.
plementation. Variations in success rate of 3-6% are ob-
served from one set of phase plate settings to another.
This variation is predicted from the limited precision of
tilt angles for the YVO4 phase plate crystals.
The imperfect 87% fidelity of secret sharing can be at-
tributed to imperfect entanglement, or purity P < 1, of
our entangled state produced by SPDC. For our appa-
ratus, the BBO crystal thickness and pump laser band-
width produce a spread in phase between |HH〉 and |V V 〉
components, so that our two-photon state is only par-
tially entangled. Separate measurements of the entan-
gled state (see Fig. 5) indicate a purity P = 0.78, or
entangled-state fidelity F = 0.87 [27], consistent with
the 87% secret-sharing fidelity we measure in the exper-
iment.
C. Eavesdropping
A maximal implementation of the photon number
splitting attack is shown in Fig. 6. First, some fraction
of the photons traveling through the apparatus would be
picked off through the use of a polarization-preserving
beamsplitter placed immediately after the first (sender)
YVO4 phase plate. The picked-off photons would be di-
rected into Eve’s polarization-analyzing detection appa-
ratus. A 50-50 beam splitter (BS) sends half of the in-
tercepted photons to be measured in the | ± x〉 basis and
the other half to be measured in the | ± y〉 basis. The
8FIG. 6: Ideal eavesdropping setup for photon number split-
ting attack. Eve picks off a fraction of the transmitted pho-
tons and measures half of them in the | ± x〉 basis, half of
them in the | ± y〉 basis. If the correlation-based protocol is
used, Eve can exploit an imperfectly prepared initial state to
determine the secret bit with better than random success.
measurement in the |±x〉 basis is done using a half-wave
plate, polarizing beamsplitter, and two detectors. The
measurement in the | ± y〉 basis is done using a quarter-
wave plate, polarizing beamsplitter, and two detectors.
Eve then counts the number of photons that entered each
detector and guesses a secret bit based on the detector
registering the most counts.
To implement a photon number splitting attack exper-
imentally, we simulated the success of the Fig. 6 eaves-
dropper via a simplified experimental setup. Rather than
performing SQQSS detection as well as simultaneous de-
tection in two bases by Eve, we omitted the final SQQSS
measurement and conducted measurements in each of
Eve’s two bases at different times in the actual exper-
iment.
The modified eavesdropping schematic is shown in
Fig. 7. The 405-nm half waveplate was rotated to obtain
different values of a2. The sender’s 810-nm half wave-
plate was present for the correlation-based protocol only.
Two of the three YVO4 crystals, left in place for con-
venience, were held at a constant position to introduce
a phase shift of 0◦. The first YVO4 crystal was tilted
to produce the four possible phase shifts introduced by
the sender. An 810-nm quarter waveplate at 45◦ allowed
measurement in the | ± y〉 vs. | ± x〉 basis to be decided
by rotation of the final 810-nm half waveplate.
To approximate an eavesdropper with perfect signal-
to-noise on her polarization analysis, we measured the
signal photon in coincidence with the idler, but with no
idler polarizer since the eavesdropper lacks access to the
idler’s polarization information. Thus the coincidence
detection improved signal-to-noise problems due to back-
ground light, but otherwise faithfully simulated an eaves-
dropper’s action.
A single run of the eavesdropping scheme consists of:
tilting the sender phase plate, setting the eavesdropper
FIG. 7: Experimental setup to simulate a photon number
splitting eavesdropping attack on the correlation-based pro-
tocol. The 405-nm HWP is rotated for different values of
a2 in the initial state. The last two YVO4 crystals are held
at a constant position to give a phase shift of ϕ = 0. For
eavesdropping on the entanglement-based protocol, the first
810-nm HWP is removed. Detection is carried out in coin-
cidence with the idler photon to improve signal-to-noise, but
no idler polarizer is used to simulate an eavesdropper with no
access to idler state information.
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FIG. 8: A plot of the success rate of an eavesdropper detecting
n= 10, 25, 50, or 100 photons per qubit, for the entanglement-
based protocol. Note the change of vertical scale from Fig. 2.
Here the eavesdropper is no longer successful despite asymme-
try in the initial two-photon state. The very small deviations
from 50% success can be attributed to imperfect alignment of
the apparatus.
half waveplate to collect count rates in |±x〉 for 50 s, and
then rotating the eavesdropper half waveplate to collect
count rates in | ± y〉 for 50 s. The observed count rates
for each sender phase setting were then used as inputs
to a Monte Carlo simulation of Eve’s success rate for a
small number of detected photons.
Observed success rates for Eve are shown here for the
correlation-based measurement (Fig. 2) and likewise for
the entanglement-based measurement (Fig. 8). The im-
perfect entangled-state purity seen in Fig. 5 does not
affect eavesdropping success. Hence the experimentally
inferred success rates closely follow the theoretical pre-
dictions discussed above.
9V. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated two SQQSS protocols using
entangled photon pairs from type-I SPDC. A photon-
number splitting attack on these protocols, exploiting
lossy transmission and asymmetric state preparation, is
demonstrated. The entanglement-based scheme is robust
against this attack while the correlation-based scheme is
not; this contrast illustrates the value of using quantum
entanglement for security of communication.
An imperfect entangled state (P < 1) causes low-
ered fidelity of secret-sharing for the entanglement-based
scheme. Specifically, in this work, P = 0.78, input state
fidelity F = 0.87, leads to secret-sharing fidelity of 87%.
Improved purity at the P ≈ 0.95 level should be possi-
ble in this apparatus with relatively minor modification,
such as addition of a compensation BBO crystal in the
pump beam to remove time/energy phase spread [28–30].
Such an improvement should lead to a secret-sharing fi-
delity of ≈97%, at which point imprecision in component
positioning will limit the overall fidelity in practice.
To further probe the strengths and weaknesses of
entanglement-secured SQQSS, other attack strategies
must be developed and implemented, or a more general
security analysis including both internal and external at-
tacks must be conducted. Further work can also address
scaling of SQQSS with the number of participants, and
variations of SQQSS in which information is encoded in
multiple entangled degrees of freedom of the photon pair.
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